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LAMENT: AGAINST VIVISECTIONAL 
JURISPRUDENCE 
Francis J. Mootz III* 
I. THE LURE OF CORPUS LINGUISTICS 
The “new textualist” approach to legal interpretation, most closely identi-
fied with the late Justice Scalia, argues that the meaning of a legal text is the 
ordinary meaning attributed to the words by an average competent speaker at 
the time of their enactment as a statute. Under this view, textual meaning is an 
empirical fact established by how language was actually used at a particular 
point in history. But what manner of investigation is appropriate to uncover this 
empirical reality? Too often, judges appear to draw on their vague intuitions 
about ordinary meaning, usually under the cover of citing to malleable and con-
tradictory dictionary definitions. This poses a serious problem because a prima-
ry justification for new textualist methods is the ability to discern legal meaning 
in an objective manner that rises above a particular judge’s subjective desires. 
Some legal theorists have recently turned to corpus analysis, claiming that 
this tool developed by professional linguists provides the empirical methodolo-
gy capable of identifying the ordinary meaning of words used in a legal text by 
rigorously examining how the words were used at a given point in the past. 
Linguists study the rules governing the use of natural language. By creating 
massive electronic databases of all manner of texts—thereby building a “corpo-
ra,” or sample “body,” to explore—linguists provide data that can be investi-
gated to determine how language is used by members of a community. Legal 
scholars argue that corpus analysis, although not foolproof, will often identify 
the ordinary meaning of words and phrases as they were used when the legal 
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text was adopted, thus providing an objective means to specify legal meaning 
under the new textualist approach. Boiled to its essence, proponents claim that 
corpus analysis of terms used in a legal text provides an empirical demonstra-
tion of the ordinary meaning of that text. 
The lure of corpus analysis for legal theorists is the most recent in a long 
history of similar Siren calls. We are seduced by the promise of a methodology 
that claims to apply the law to a specific case in a manner that permits observ-
ers to monitor and assess whether that application of the law is objectively cor-
rect. But this allure inevitably founders on the rocks, leaving us unfulfilled, dis-
appointed, and searching for the next promising suitor to lead us to a method 
for determining objectively correct answers. 
What is the source of our desire to identify an objectively correct meaning? 
In the modern democratic era, we have assumed that the rule of law depends on 
the existence of a fundamental distinction between lawmaking and law en-
forcement. On one hand, the law is the will of the people communicated 
through their representatives and constrained only by constitutional norms. On 
the other hand, the executive branch enforces the law, subject only to judicial 
review that is constrained by deference to the policy choices made exclusively 
by the legislature. Simply put, under this traditional view, rule of law values are 
achieved when the law is first democratically promulgated, and then later faith-
fully applied. My thesis is that this proposition in not only too simply put, it is 
fundamentally incorrect. 
It has long been a truism that “we are all realists now.” In its conservative 
manifestation, realism abandoned the hope for formal deductive methods of de-
cision making and sought to align law with social science and empirical meth-
ods. In this sense, the turn to corpus analysis is certainly part of the broad tradi-
tion of realism. However, the legal system has never come close to 
internalizing the most radical implications of the realist critique of legal prac-
tice. In its most important and profound iteration, the realists questioned the 
foundational theoretical premise of modern law that there is a sharp distinction 
between creating law and applying law. Contemporary theorists pay a steep 
cost for refusing to attend to this lesson. Legal scholars turning to corpus analy-
sis are again engaging in the fool’s errand of establishing methods that do not 
depend on the exercise of judgment to achieve justice. They cannot save them-
selves from returning to this fruitless quest because they refuse to acknowledge 
the fundamental reality that legal meaning can be known only in its application 
in the present, and never as a brute empirical fact of language patterns that can 
be uncovered scientifically by interpreters in the present. Unfortunately, suc-
cessive failures to devise a methodology that can render judging objective just 
harden the resolve of contemporary scholars rather than suggest that they aban-
don the effort. 
In this essay I argue against the deep impulse that motivates the contempo-
rary turn to corpus linguistics precisely because this enticing “new” method 
reinscribes the profoundly misguided theoretical premise of modern law that 
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there are ontological and epistemological distinctions between the law and its 
application to a specific case. In his oration at the commencement of the 1708 
term at the University of Naples, Giambattista, Vico lamented the abandonment 
of rhetorical understanding and the misguided embrace of Cartesian analysis as 
the model of genuine knowledge. The past three centuries have borne witness 
to this slavish adherence to a focus on objective and empirical inquiry, neglect-
ing the unavoidable role of rhetorical persuasion in legal meaning. My essay 
proceeds in the spirit of Vico’s great oration. I urge that, at long last, we should 
return to a conception of legal meaning as rhetorical knowledge. 
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ORDINARY MEANING 
I begin by stepping back and posing a basic question. It is commonplace 
that lawyers, judges, and legal scholars begin with a commitment to the ordi-
nary meaning of legal texts. Corpus linguistics is appealing precisely because it 
promises to provide empirical evidence of the ordinary meaning of language as 
used in discourse at a given point in time. But this begs the question: Why is 
ordinary meaning the foundational premise of legal interpretation? 
Historically, the law was unwritten, hidden, and mysterious. To claim to 
know the law was an affront to the Gods and the demands of ineffable justice. 
For the common man to lay claim to understanding the law was pure hubris. 
This has now changed. Our contemporary commitment to adhere to the ordi-
nary meaning of legal texts is a manifestation of the strong modern impulse to 
uphold democratic governance. We now firmly believe that the law is from the 
people, for the people, and deeply part of the people. We reject the comfort of 
having a powerful priest, standing with his back to us and chanting magic 
words in a foreign language, serve as the fount of justice. We aspire to justice 
that is a sacrament brought forth in the people’s language, worked out in the 
people’s language, and expressed to the people in the people’s language. 
We adhere to ordinary meaning, then, as part of our commitment to demo-
cratic dialogue. Democratic dialogue is complex and non-linear; it requires 
judgment and humility. It is critical that we not permit the commitment to ordi-
nary meaning—a vital part of our jurisprudence—to be twisted into a commit-
ment to a narrow methodologism. This goal is best achieved by recognizing 
that the commitment to ordinary meaning is really the commitment to the use 
of natural language—as opposed to a wholly technical or specialized lan-
guage—to resolve legal questions. 
Consider two friends engaged in a discussion about how to handle an im-
portant dilemma that has arisen in their lives. Would we ever claim that this use 
of natural language and its reliance on ordinary meaning can be the source of 
objectivity and determinacy? Of course not. Would we ever fear that this use of 
natural language and its ordinary meaning is an invitation to irrationalism and 
incoherence? Of course not. In this case, the ordinary meaning of their delibera-
tion is the product of a pragmatic, dialogic engagement that draws upon an 
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open-textured set of topics. Our commitment to ordinary meaning in the legal 
system is a commitment to working within the realm of natural language and 
rejecting the Cartesian ideals of determinant and objective analysis. 
Ironically, successive efforts to cabin ordinary meaning with methodologi-
cal rigor tends to reduce law to a more specialized language that avoids the 
openness of natural language and the imprecision of ordinary meaning. Instead 
of working through legal questions in a living, natural language, proponents of 
objectivity pursue a goal that is metaphorically captured by the television show, 
The Walking Dead. The meaning of words is frozen in time, but they continue 
to stumble forward in a zombie-like existence in the present. There is nothing 
“ordinary” or “natural” about this situation. It is positively horrifying! 
III. AGAINST VIVISECTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 
Corpus linguistics is premised on the idea that we can perform a scientific 
operation to discern an objective reality about past language use, much like an-
imal researchers who cut into the bodies of living animals to understand the 
meaning of life. In one case, the corpus is subject to data analytics and qualita-
tive assessment; in the other case, the “body” is literally presented for dissec-
tional analysis. Vivisection is a ghastly exercise. As a monkey struggles in con-
straints, its brain is probed and stimulated to discover how the body works. It 
may well be the case that we learn something important from this scientific ap-
proach. Indeed, we may gain vitally important knowledge that assists us in 
formulating diagnostic protocols and treatments. But this is not to say that we 
are experiencing the subject in an ordinary manner. Indeed, this is an extraor-
dinary intrusion and reduction of the subject that is viewed by many as immor-
al. The living organism is distressed and ignored. Vivisection is a highly unu-
sual and specialized effort designed to achieve very focused and limited 
objectives. And these limited objectives must be weighed against the very ob-
vious and substantial costs. 
It is not overly dramatic to ask the supporters of corpus analysis whether 
judges should consider themselves lab scientists who engage in the vivisection 
of natural language in a quest to identify objective meaning. What training 
would judges have to undergo to gain access to this knowledge? One does not 
quickly read a few manuals and then enter the lab with a scalpel. Judicial vivi-
section, if done properly, would require years of training. Linguists are specifi-
cally trained for corpus analysis, and we should leave it to the professionals to 
conduct these academic inquiries rather than re-purpose practically oriented 
judges working within natural language to become vivisectionist scientists. 
My claim is not radical. I am merely pleading that we should authorize 
judges to exercise judgment about the ordinary meaning of the law as it is ap-
plied to present questions. The motivation to use corpus analysis comes from 
the commitment to defend ordinary meaning, but it quickly veers off into the 
vivisectional aspirations of modern scientists. Judges should embrace the ordi-
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nary meaning of natural language used in legal texts and should reject the vivi-
sectionist urge to master meaning by subjecting it to methodological impera-
tives. Ordinary meaning is not data to be drawn from a body that is strapped to 
a table; instead, it is the language in which the legislature must act and the lan-
guage in which judges must apply the laws. It is the language of democratic 
governance rather than the language of scientific certainty. 
As Vico argued long ago, we must give Cartesian methodologism its due, 
but also recognize its limitations. We must embrace the radical innovation that 
our commitment to use natural language and ordinary meaning to identify prob-
lems and appropriate solutions commits us to an integrated rhetorical and her-
meneutical practice. Judging always poses a question of how the historically 
unfolding meaning of the text has significance for the case at hand. There is no 
object, frozen in the past, that is retrieved, sedated, and subjected to disinterest-
ed dissection. There is only the present case in which we are called to exercise 
judgment. 
IV. A REPLY TO CRITICS 
My thesis will certainly generate criticisms. Most significantly, critics 
might ask what harm can come from a modest embrace of corpus linguistics if 
it is a tool that is used wisely and with discretion? Is there really a danger in 
learning more about how relevant language in a legal text is used in ordinary 
discourse? The question, these critics would emphasize, is not whether corpus 
linguistics can fully determine the results in all cases, but whether it can occa-
sionally be of some assistance to lawyers and judges. 
In some cases, it very well might be helpful to permit expert testimony in 
the form of a corpus analysis of legal language. The issue is not whether corpus 
analysis might productively be employed as a tool of interpretation in select 
cases, but whether it should be celebrated as the methodology for determining 
ordinary meaning. As with other efforts to subject judgment to a method, the 
problem with corpus analysis is that there is far too much leeway in choosing 
how to wield the tool. Just as judges may search for friendly dictionary defini-
tions to support their analysis of ordinary meaning, corpus analysis is subject to 
multiple factors and inputs. Advocates might construct competing corpora for a 
case, investigators may take different approaches to qualitative analysis of the 
analytical results, and opposed judgments can be drawn from the data. There 
are simply too many variables even within the scope of corpus analysis to ex-
pect definitive results. 
Although corpus analysis is just now entering legal practice, these infirmi-
ties are quickly becoming evident. A self-described group of “Scholars of Cor-
pus Linguistics” filed an amicus brief in the 2019 Supreme Court case of Rimi-
ni Street v. Oracle arguing that a statute had a clear meaning. It should come as 
no surprise that a brief rejecting this analysis was filed by a group who desig-
nated themselves as “Scholars of Linguistics.” It should be even less surprising 
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that Justice Kavanaugh authored an opinion for a unanimous court that cited 
neither brief and used a variety of ordinary tools of statutory interpretation to 
resolve the case. It is far from clear that corpus analysis will provide definitive 
guidance to judges and lawyers seeking to articulate legal meaning. This does 
not discredit corpus analysis as developed by professional linguists; instead, it 
cautions judges against assuming that they can easily adapt this analytic tool to 
their obligation to judge cases under the law. 
As a fallback position, critics might concede that corpus linguistics does 
not provide definitive answers about the ordinary meaning of statutes, but still 
insist that applying this method constrains judges by virtue of the technical re-
quirements of conducting a corpus analysis. Under this more pragmatic view, a 
single determinant meaning of statutory language may not always be discerna-
ble, but if judges act “as if” such meaning exists and adhere to corpus analysis, 
it will secure rule of law values. Unfortunately, this posture would provide 
scant constraint against judicial activism. As a general matter, adoption of a 
highly technical approach to legal rules generally favors elites who can employ 
sophisticated legal teams to manipulate the game from within the technical 
field. Karl Llewellyn employed this wisdom in Article Two of the Uniform 
Commercial Code by using natural language to state general rules, and then re-
inforcing the purpose of the rules through the Official Comments. Supporters of 
his approach would argue that Article Two’s simply stated obligation of “good 
faith” has proved more predictable and effective than detailed, confusing, and 
highly technical regulations by state and federal governments. Discerning good 
faith in the facts before the court is an inquiry undertaken in ordinary, natural 
language about the values we hold dear in the realm of commercial behavior. 
Acting “as if” there is a linguistic method that narrows the scope of inquiry has 
the negative effect of interfering with the task at hand of rendering judgment. 
More important, it is likely that in many cases corpus analysis will not just 
be unable to specify a determinant meaning of legal language, it will positively 
result in a finding that there is no definitive original meaning of the relevant 
words or phrases. As with most methodologies, the proponents may find them-
selves hoist with their own petard in ways that unsettlingly reveal the inadequa-
cies of the method. Proponents suggest that this underscores the ideologically 
neutral character of the methodology, but it also underscores the significant 
limitations of the method even if supported only by the “as if” justification. 
CONCLUSION: AGAINST VIVISECTION 
The proponents of corpus analysis begin with a commitment to ordinary 
meaning but fail to recognize the degree to which their sophisticated inquiry 
abandons ordinary discourse in natural language. Judicial discourse, particular-
ly at the level of Supreme Court opinions, is highly complex, technical, and 
(ostensibly) rigorous and objective. Average citizens do not read opinions and 
discuss them in their own terms. Why do adherents of corpus analysis believe 
that a linguistic method can assist in understanding ordinary meaning, when 
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meaning at this level is anything but ordinary? Corpus analysis promises only 
to increase the trend toward technical argumentation designed to foreclose lines 
of inquiry in the interest of objectivity and determinant meaning. 
We should read state trial court memoranda and oral arguments from mo-
tion day in state court if we want to understand the commitment to ordinary 
meaning. Legal discourse at this level is not a lapse from ordinary meaning but 
instead preserves ordinary meaning in the legal system in the face of the judi-
cial discourse of elites at the highest levels. Rather than emboldening the elites, 
shouldn’t we recognize that their deviation from ordinary meaning with an ap-
proach that seeks objectivity and invites techniques such as corpus linguistics is 
a deviation from their critical roles in a democracy? The oft-stated commitment 
to ordinary meaning is profound; it should not be overcome by the insinuation 
of scientific methods that are abrasive to how ordinary meaning is explicated in 
genuine dialogue. 
I do not ascribe ill motives to those promoting corpus linguistics. Judges, 
lawyers, and academics are working in good faith toward the honorable goal of 
reducing the cognitive and volitional burdens on legal actors who must exercise 
judgment. What a relief to have a scientific inquiry that renders judgment ob-
jective! “If only justice could be secured by an algorithm, we could ensure jus-
tice,” one hears in the justification of corpus analysis. Indeed, it is a comforting 
story. But justice is secured through the vagaries of ordinary language, and it is 
within ordinary language that we must struggle against judicial biases and limi-
tations to implement the people’s law. 
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